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Abstract
There has been a worldwide growing public concern regarding transit bus fires, mainly 
because of their association with severe loss of human life and property. As a result, 
numerous studies have been carried out to investigate the causes, factors, and features 
of such accidents, along with research focusing on the simulation of bus fire scenarios. 
However, a detailed analysis on the causes of bus fires and the inter-relationships of risk 
factors is lacking. This study identified 17 risk factors associated with bus fires through 
an analysis of accident records from China using the Delphi approach. An integrated 
interpretative structural modeling (ISM) was adopted to explore the interactions among 
risk factors associated with bus fires, providing a useful hierarchy of risk factors whose 
individual relationships are unambiguous but whose group relationships are too complex 
to organize intuitively. This can help practitioners better understand risk dependencies 
and prioritize risk mitigation efforts. Results show that a lack of safety education and 
safety knowledge popularization and inadequate laws and regulations are the two most 
important risk factors associated with bus fires. Drivers also play an important role 
in preventing accidents. The analysis can be extended to risk analysis in other types of 
accidents, i.e., railway accidents and coach accidents. 
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Introduction
Transit bus fires have drawn considerable attention worldwide owing to their frequent 
occurrence. Although buses generally are considered to be a relatively safe means of 
transportation, the loss of property and human life caused by bus fires is far from 
negligible. Generally, bus drivers and passengers can quickly flee the scene during a bus 
fire, leading to fewer casualties in comparison to bus crashes. However, in most cases, it 
is very likely that the bus will completely burn within 15–20 minutes after the start of a 
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fire (Meltzer and Ayres et al. 2010), causing property damage in the tens of thousands 
of dollars up to the replacement cost of the bus (estimated to be $100,000). Numerous 
reports on bus fires, particularly those with high casualties, provide unprecedented 
examples of the potential human toll of a transit bus fire. According to documents of 
the China Fire Department of Ministry of Public Security (FDMPS), approximately 3,000 
bus fires occurred in China in 2014, a number that has grown steadily since 2010, with 
no indication of an improvement in this trend. These fires caused an estimated annual 
average of 50 civilian deaths, 300 civilian injuries, and $30.2 million in direct property 
damage per year. Therefore, extensive research is needed to determine the causes of bus 
fires to reduce the frequency of bus fire accidents.   
Previous Research
Previous research on bus fires focused primarily on the following two aspects:
• Accident factors and features – Chow conducted several studies on bus fire 
accidents. He analyzed different materials that affect fire safety and their release 
rate (Chow 1999) and then used empirical equations for analyzing types of 
materials that are more easily subjected to flashover (Chow 2001). He applied 
the test results to a sandwich panel sample commonly used in the construction 
industry with a calorimeter to study the manner in which incident thermal 
radiation heat flux affects the behavior of materials subjected to fire (Chow 2003), 
then investigated the flowing and diffusing mechanism of smoke in bus fires and 
proposed a smoke control strategy (Chow 2006). Lönnermark (2005) analyzed the 
characteristics of bus fires that occurred in tunnels and determined a method for 
calculating the CO/CO2 ratio, flame length, and other indexes. Chun-ming (2006) 
analyzed several bus fire incidents in China and summarized the features and 
factors of bus fires through a systemic analysis. 
• Simulation of bus fire scenario – Some studies have used full-scale vehicles 
to simulate bus fires; for instance, Johnsson and Yang (2015) placed several 
thermocouples (TCs) in wheels, tires, wheel wells, and other locations to monitor 
the heat release rate (HRR) of each vehicle part. Other studies used small-scale 
vehicles to simulate bus fires; for example, Försth et al. (2013) used the different 
materials of different bus components such as walls, ceilings, seats, curtains, 
instrument boards, etc., to test their horizontal burning rate, vertical burning 
rate, and critical heat flux, and determine whether they could pass the ISO 
(International Organization for Standardization) 3795, ISO 6941, and ISO 5658-2 
tests. Other studies on bus fires mainly used numerical simulation software 
such as Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), Smokeview, and PyroSim. Based on the 
descriptions of evacuees and rescuers, as well as combustion evidence from 
the scene, Bi et al. (2010) reconstructed a bus fire scene by adopting parallel 
operation. The simulation results obtained were compared with the fire site 
reconnaissance results, demonstrating reliable prediction of the fire process and 
smoke movement calculation. Jia-lei et al. (2010) simulated two types of typical 
bus fires and confirmed that different interior materials have different impacts 
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on bus fires; they also determined that bus fires were influenced by whether the 
doors or windows were open or closed and, accordingly, developed some fire 
control strategies. 
As indicated, previous research on bus fires mainly focused on accident factors and 
features as well as the burning characteristics of different materials; however, not many 
studies have been conducted to investigate the reasons for bus fires and the inter-
relationships of risk factors. Further, past cases on bus fires also have not been used to 
conduct an analysis. Therefore, this study aimed to confirm the risk factors affecting 
bus fires by analyzing numerous bus fire accidents and to identify and summarize the 
relationships among these factors by using interpretative structural modeling (ISM) to 
classify their importance for undertaking specific measures to prevent bus fires.
Data
Only a few studies have focused on bus fires despite their frequent occurrence. This 
likely is because of the difficulty in acquiring related data. For example, departments, 
agencies, databases, etc., associated with bus fires often lack detailed statistics and 
analysis of data. On a positive note, however, there is growing concern over bus fires 
from society and the media, which makes it simpler to obtain the time, place, number 
of casualties, cause, and even details of accidents from the Internet. In the current 
research, we obtained data from reports of the Chinese media, the investigation results 
of the FDMPS, and accident particulars from the China fire services yearbook (2011–
2014). Basic information on accidents is shown in Table 1, which lists 12,633 accidents, of 
which 20 typical accidents were selected for detailed analysis (Table 2). 
TABLE 1. 
Basic Information on Bus 
Fires in China
Categories/Variables Number Percentage
Year
2011 2,984 23.62%
2012 3,172 25.11%
2013 3,083 24.40%
2014 3,394 26.87%
Primary Causes
Arson 2,984 23.62%
Electrical fault 3,172 25.11%
Vehicle fault 3,083 24.40%
Playing with fire (harmlessness) 3,394 26.87%
Smoking 618 4.89%
Spontaneous combustion 5,047 39.95%
Lighting stroke 1,891 14.97%
Static 674 5.33%
Unknown 715 5.66%
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No. Location Date Causalities
Causes
Driver Passenger Arson Vehicle Environment
1 Beijing 5/29/2014 0 ü ü ü
2 Changchun 5/6/2013 0 ü
3 Chengdu 5/6/2009 101 ü ü ü
4 Guangzhou 7/15/2014 34 ü ü
5 Guiyang 2/27/2014 37 ü ü ü
6 Hangzhou 7/21/2010 0 ü ü
7 Hangzhou 7/5/2014 32 ü ü
8 Harbin 6/13/2014 0 ü ü
9 Hefei 6/27/2014 0 ü ü ü
10 Huhehot 3/14/2015 0 ü ü
11 Jinzhou 10/14/2014 2 ü ü
12 Liuzhou 11/21/2014 18 ü
13 Qufu 3/12/2015 0 ü ü
14 Sian 3/6/2015 0 ü
15 Taizhou 8/22/2013 0 ü ü ü
16 Wuhan 4/8/2013 0 ü ü ü
17 Wuhan 6/21/2012 0 ü ü
18 Xiamen 6/7/2013 81 ü ü
19 Xiamen 1/16/2015 12 ü ü
20 Yantai 8/20/2014 20 ü ü ü
Research Method 
The aim of this research was to identify key risk factors associated with bus fires and 
explore how these risk factors interact with each other. Previous methods such as 
those involving a questionnaire survey are not adequate, as they cannot distinguish 
the relationships between risk factors. Therefore, the Delphi method was chosen 
to identify these risk factors associated with bus fires, and interpretive structural 
modeling (ISM) was adopted to explore the interactions among them.
Delphi Method
There are two stages in the Delphi method. The first involves drawing a final list of risk 
factors, and the second involves investigating the interactions of the risk factors. All 
information was collected via Delphi questionnaires. Questionnaires were sent to 15 
experts having different jobs in this area who agreed to participate in this research via 
e-mail. The profiles of the experts are presented in Table 3. 
TABLE 2. 
Characteristics of Typical 
Accidents
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Codename Working Organization Role in Organization
A Transportation authority Director
B Transportation authority Director
C Fire department Director
D University Professor
E University Professor
F University Professor
G University Professor
H University Professor
I University Professor
J University Associate Professor
K University Associate Professor
L Vehicle company Chief Engineer
M Vehicle company Engineer
N Bus operating company General Manager
O Bus operating company Bus driver
First Stage of Delphi Method
The aim of the first stage was to search for risk factors; to this end, the following steps 
are taken:
1. Experts that fit the criteria were selected. 
2. An information sheet and a list of questions were sent to all experts via e-mail. 
The information sheet contained background, current situation, and data of 
overall accidents and a detailed description of typical bus fire records. 
3. All experts were asked to identify at least 10 key risk factors that affect bus fires 
and to provide descriptions of those risk factors within 150 words.
4. The risk factors identified by the experts and the findings of the literature survey 
were included in a new information sheet. 
5. The new information sheet was provided to the experts, who then were invited to 
add or modify the list. In the end, a consensus was reached through three rounds 
of feedback sessions.
Second Stage of Delphi Method 
The second stage involved investigating the relationships between risk factors 
determined from the first stage. During this stage, the experts were asked to evaluate if 
there are interactions between each pair of risk factors associated with bus fires:
• Questionnaire (a): Please identify those risk factors that influence Si.
• Questionnaire (b): Please identify those risk factors that are influenced by Si. 
TABLE 3.
Profile of Delphi Experts
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After three rounds, a consensus was reached, and the interactive relationships between 
risk factors associated with bus fires were analyzed via an integrated ISM model.
Interpretive Structural Modeling
ISM, first proposed by Warfield in 1973 with the aim of analyzing complex 
socioeconomic systems, is an effective tool for determining the interactions between 
specific items (Singh and Kant 2008). Generally, the major steps involved in the ISM 
technique are as follows:
1. Set the reachability matrix. A reachability matrix is used to represent the extent to 
which different nodes in a directed graph can reach (i.e., indirect influence) each 
other through certain channels. The feature of transformation means that if there 
is one channel that element Si can reach Sj directly, there is also one channel that Sj 
can reach Sk. Therefore, there must be two channels that Si can reach Sk. M is used 
to present reachability matrix. Matrix A is used to achieve M. A is the adjacent 
matrix obtained from the second stage of Delphi method. The element in it, aij, 
equals to 1 when Si has influence on Sj, otherwise it equals to 0. The following 
formula presents the process of using A to achieve M. The Boolean algebra 
operation rules are selected for the matrix power operation in the formula. 
Finally, 
 
2. Partition the reachability matrix. According to the reachability matrix, the 
reachability sets and antecedent sets of every factor must be determined. The 
reachability set is composed of all the related elements that Si can reach (has 
an impact). The antecedent set is the set composed of all the elements that can 
reach Si.
3. Draw the ISM relationship diagram. In accordance with the results of partitioning 
the reachability matrix, the reachability matrix is rearranged, and then the 
structure matrix S can be obtained. With the help of S, a multilevel hierarchical 
structural diagram can be drawn.
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Identification of Risk Factors Associated with Bus Fires 
Using the Delphi method, a final list of 17 risk factors was obtained, which were mainly 
related to three entities: people, vehicle, and environment. From Tables 1 and 2, we can 
conclude that the causes can be classified under these three entities, and the risk factors 
associated with bus fires caused by these three entities were identified.
People
People play the most important and active part in bus fires; this entity can be further 
divided into drivers and passengers. 
Risk factors attributed to drivers include the following: 
• Negligence of routine safety inspection. This may lead to the risk of fire starting 
in the engine, electric devices, and other undetected interior structures in the 
bus; in addition, the loss or damage of emergency hammers and extinguishers 
also may lead to more casualties (Knipling and Hickman et al. 2003; Underwood 
and Chapman et al. 2003). Focusing on cases 9, 10, and 13 from Table 2, all the 
drivers neglected safety inspection, resulting in the bus experiencing spontaneous 
combustion on the road; fortunately, there were no casualties, and only the buses 
were burnt.
• Lack of safety awareness and knowledge. Historically, the education level of 
bus drivers in China is extremely low, lower than the average level of the whole 
society. Since driving a bus is stressful and poorly paid, fewer and fewer people 
want to be bus drivers, especially young people with a higher education level. 
Accident records also show that the drivers primarily are middle-age and have 
low safety knowledge, a serious condition that is common in China and a factors 
mentioned by all Delphi experts. 
• Risky driving behaviors. Overloading may render passenger evacuation difficult, 
and driving at high speed, under the influence of alcohol, or while fatigued may 
cause drivers to react and respond to fire hazards slowly, resulting in more severe 
accidents (Tseng 2012; Nirupama and Hafezi 2014; Mallia and Lazuras et al. 2015). 
For instance, case 18 in Table 2 was caused by arson and resulted in 48 deaths and 
33 injuries. Overloading contributed significantly to the serious casualties, since it 
was impossible for nearly 100 occupants to escape from the burning bus quickly 
(in 2 minutes or so) in panic circumstances.
Risk factors attributed to passengers include the following:
• Possession of flammable and explosive goods. Unlike stations for subways, trains, 
planes, and other modes of transport, usually there are no security inspection 
devices at bus stations, thus allowing passengers to carry anything aboard. 
According to FDMPS, this has led to hundreds of bus fires every year in China, 
especially in small cities. There is also some concurrence from the Delphi experts, 
one of whom noted that “… in my career, there are always people carrying 
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alcohol, gasoline, or other explosive goods when taking buses; especially during 
the Chinese Spring Festival, almost everyone carries all kinds of firecrackers, and 
this kind of behavior may lead to fire easily….”
• Possession of fire sources. Generally, the interiors of vehicles in China are made 
of numerous flammable materials. Some buses designed for the cold north area 
contain cotton seat cushions, and some advertisements in the bus are made of 
paper or other flammable sources. A spark to a flammable material in a bus can 
easily lead to fire accidents. For example, a person smoking in a bus caused a fire 
in Liuzhou (case 12). Some Delphi experts mentioned that although smoking and 
lighters in buses are not common in big cities, they are very common in small 
cities, especially in poor provinces. 
• Delay in reporting suspicious circumstances to drivers. There is usually a certain 
smell, smoke, and/or sound when a bus first catches fire; in addition, arsonists 
carrying combustible goods usually behave strangely. If passengers would report 
these circumstances in a timely manner, the consequences of a fire may decrease 
and perhaps could be prevented. 
• Arson and destruction. Arson and destruction are frequent occurrences, and the 
circumstances of fires caused by arson are generally the same. Most arsonists 
have fire sources and liquid flammable goods with them and set fires from blind 
areas in the bus. The beginning of a fire set by an arsonist can be is difficult to 
recognize because arsonists tend to hide the fire. As a result, the fires are more 
swift and violent than those caused by smoking or bad weather. Cases 3, 4, 5, 7, 
18, 19, and 20 were all mainly caused by arson, and the number of injuries and 
deaths was extremely high. It is worth noting that all the Delphi experts listed this 
entry on their answer sheets. Arson is a significant cause of bus fires, and from 
the yearbooks of FDMPS, the proportion of bus fires caused by arson has risen 
steadily since 2010.  
Vehicle
In many cases, the bus itself is the source of a fire, and it also plays an important part in 
accidents. Risk factors attributed to the vehicle include the following:
• Design defect. With plenty of flammable materials on buses and inappropriate 
structure design, the likelihood of bus fires has increased (Parsons 1990). There are 
still no specific standards on bus fireproofing, and China’s local vehicle companies 
are not forced to produce fireproof buses for economic reasons. There were no 
fireproof buses in China until 2009, and a so-called “fireproof” bus can spray water 
only on the command of the bus driver when a fire occurs. In addition, some buses 
are not suitable for lengthy driving in bad weather, such as hot temperatures and 
lightning. Some buses are designed for the cold north area, but some cities in the 
hot south area use buses that could result in bus fires (e.g., case 9).
• Performance aging. Service over a long period of time may cause the equipment 
to age, particularly the engine, electrical equipment, and exhaust system, which 
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can be hazardous (Ming and Tian et al. 2009). It is common in China that transit 
buses in small cities, especially in underdeveloped provinces, are obsolete buses 
that previously were used for years in bigger cities. This also was noted by all 
Delphi experts.
• Lack of maintenance. A driver usually fixes a minor problem with a bus during 
operation; however, this could cause a fire hazard (Hammarström et al. 2008). In 
addition, some maintenance agencies may not have proper qualifications for bus 
maintenance, and parts for buses may not be ordered or installed correctly. Also, 
if a bus does not undergo regular routine maintenance, the equipment inside it 
may age, increasing the probability of fire. In the opinion of the Delphi experts, 
performance aging and lack of maintenance are inter-related factors: a lack of 
routine maintenance leads to aging of a bus, and as a bus ages, drivers are less 
likely to maintain it regularly.
• Low-quality fuel. Some refueling stations may supply low-quality fuel, and 
some drivers prefer to purchase fuel in bulk instead of from refueling stations. 
According to results of the examination of gas stations in Shandong Province, fuel 
supplied at 2,083 of 6,630 gas stations were found to not meet standard quality. 
More specifically, some of the fuels had lower ignition temperatures or were very 
volatile, which can increase the possibility of fires. Some Delphi experts strongly 
encouraged the inclusion of this risk factor, noting that extended use of low-
quality fuel can easily lead to poor performance and premature wear and may 
result in engine damage. 
• Lack of fire-extinguishing and emergency escape installations. Fire extinguishers 
are either not installed or lose efficacy in some buses, resulting in a delay in 
suppressing a fire. In addition, safety hammers, relief valves, and other survival 
equipment often are lost or broken, making evacuation difficult. 
Environment 
Risk factors attributed to the environment include the following:
• Social contradictions. Intensified social conflicts increase the probability of arson, 
malicious damage, and even terrorist attack.
• Lack of safety education and safety knowledge popularization. Owing to an 
unclear understanding of safety knowledge, drivers do not know how to prevent 
fires, put out fires in a timely manner, and evacuate passengers. In addition, 
passengers are unaware of what type of goods can be carried safely and how to 
escape effectively.
• Inadequate laws and regulations. Compared with car accidents, attention to bus 
fires is limited, resulting in a lack of effective laws, regulations, and accountability; 
hence, it is difficult to warn about and prevent illegal behavior. 
• Bad roads. Road alignment, road profile, surface type, and traffic capacity impact 
bus safety differently (Kaplan and Prato 2012).
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• Bad weather. The probability of bus fires increases considerably in hot conditions 
and thunderstorms. For instance, approximately 10 bus fires occur every year in 
the U.S. because of bad weather (Ahrens 2006). 
The 17 risk factors and their relationships were determined, after agreement among by 
Delphi experts. These relationships are presented in Table 4.
TABLE 4. 
Relationships between 
Risk Factors Associated with 
Bus Fires
No. Risk Factors (Si) Risk Factors Influenced by Si
Driver Level
1 Negligence of routine safety inspection 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
2 Lack of safety awareness and knowledge 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
3 Risky driving behaviors 4, 5
Passenger Level
4 Possession of flammable and explosive goods 7
5 Possession of fire sources 7
6 Delay in reporting suspicious circumstances to driver 7
7 Arson and destruction -
Vehicle Level
8 Design defect 9, 10, 12
9 Performance aging 10
10 Lack of maintenance 9
11 Low-quality fuel -
12 Lack of fire-extinguishing and emergency escape installations -
Environment Level
13 Social contradictions 7
14 Lack of safety education and safety knowledge popularization 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12
15 Inadequate laws and regulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12
16 Bad road -
17 Bad weather -
ISM Analysis
In the previous sections, the identification of risk factors associated with bus fires was 
proposed according to the Delphi approach. In this section, ISM is employed to explore 
how these risk factors interact with each other. An adjacency matrix, reachability 
matrix, and all iterations results are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. 
Elements 1–17 represent the 17 risk factors. In addition, a digraph of risk factors 
associated with bus fires is shown in Figure 1 and shows the levels of all the risk factors.
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Elements
(i/j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 5.
Adjacency Matrix
TABLE 6. 
Reachability Matrix
Elements
(i/j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Element
(Si)
Reachability Set: R(Si) Antecedent Set: A(Si)
Intersection
R(Si) ∩ A(Si)
Level
1 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 1, 2, 14, 15 1
2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 2, 14, 15 2
3 3, 4, 5, 7 2, 3, 14, 15 3
4 4, 7 2, 3, 4, 14, 15 4
5 5, 7 2, 3, 5, 14, 15 5
6 6, 7 6, 14 6
7 7 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15 7 I
8 8, 9, 10, 12 1, 2, 8, 14, 15 8
9 9, 10 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 9, 10 I
10 9, 10 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 9, 10 I
11 11 1, 2, 11, 14, 15 11 I
12 12 1, 2, 8, 12, 14, 15 12 I
13 7, 13 13 13
14 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 14 14
15 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 15 15
16 16 16 16 I
17 17 17 17 I
1 1, 8 1, 2, 14, 15 1
2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 2, 14, 15 2
3 3, 4, 5 2, 3, 14, 15 3
4 4 2, 3, 4, 14, 15 4 II
5 5 2, 3, 5, 14, 15 5 II
6 6 6, 14 6 II
8 8 1, 2, 8, 14, 15 8 II
13 13 13 13 II
14 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14 14 14
15 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15 15 15
1 1 1, 2, 14, 15 1 III
2 1, 2, 3 2, 14, 15 2
3 3 2, 3, 14, 15 3 III
14 1, 2, 3, 14 14 14
15 1, 2, 3, 15 15 15
2 2 2, 14, 15 2 IV
14 2, 14 14 14
15 2, 15 15 15
14 14 14 14 V
15 15 15 15 V
TABLE 7.
All Iterations’ Results
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FIGURE 1.
Digraph of risks in 
bus fires
From Figure 1, we conclude some useful findings:
• All the risk factors associated with bus fires can be classified into five levels. The 
factors in the first level will directly affect bus fires. The factors in middle levels 
(II, III, and IV) are elements that indirectly influence bus fires and play a role in 
connecting the levels above and below. The last level (V) presents the macro-level 
factors of bus fires. In addition, factors at a higher level will be influenced by those 
at lower levels, and there are direct impacts between factors at adjacent levels. In 
other words, changes in low-level factors will emerge in middle-level factors, so 
low-level factors can “control” middle-level factors, which is why they are more 
important in the whole hierarchical structure. 
• Seven superficial factors have a direct impact on bus fires: arson and destruction 
(7), performance aging (9), lack of maintenance (10), low-quality fuel (11), lack of 
fire-extinguishing and emergency escape installations (12), bad roads (16), and 
bad weather (17). These factors cannot influence the others—that is, they are 
independent factors.
• The factors in levels II, III, and IV are influenced by the lower levels and do 
not directly influence bus fires. Level II includes possession of flammable and 
explosive goods (4), possession of fire sources (5), delay in reporting suspicious 
circumstances to the driver (6), design defects (8), and social contradictions (13). 
Level III includes negligence of routine safety inspection (1) and risky driving 
behaviors (3). Level IV includes lack of safety awareness and knowledge (2). The 
main impact of these factors on bus fires can be likened to connection links; in 
other words, they are connective factors.
• Level V factors influence others but are not influenced by others: lack of safety 
education and safety knowledge popularization (14) and inadequate laws and 
regulations (15). These factors are at the bottom of ISM structure, symbolizing 
that they have a fundamental impact on bus fires—namely, depth factors.
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• Most vehicle-level elements are present in the high levels (I and II), indicating that 
vehicles play a direct role in bus fires; of course, the vehicle is also the locality of 
a bus fire. Table 1 also shows that vehicle fault and electrical fault are the direct 
causes of more than 50% accidents, so measures on vehicle levels will directly 
influence bus fires. 
• Arson and destruction (7) are driven by possession of flammable and 
explosive goods (4), possession of fire sources (5), delay in reporting suspicious 
circumstances to the driver (6), and social contradictions (13). Arsonists are anti-
society, and it is difficult to recognize them. Obviously, arsonists need flammable, 
explosive goods and fire sources to set fires. When they bring them onto buses, 
if other passengers recognize them and report them to the driver, the fire may 
be prevented. In addition, when an arsonist sets a fire, instead of screaming or 
escaping in a disorderly manner, passengers could take measures such as using a 
fire extinguisher; in this way, the consequences of the fires may be mitigated while 
allowing for an increase in evacuation time. 
• Most passenger-related elements are connective factors, and all are driven by 
driver-related factors; in other words, drivers have influence on passengers. This 
indicates that passengers should not only be asked to control their own behaviors 
but also need drivers to keep an eye on them. As noted in some accident records, 
the reason for a fire was that a driver failed to forbid passengers from carrying 
forbidden goods, smoking, and so on.
• All driver-related elements are present in the middle levels (III and IV), and 
they are influenced by depth factors. More specifically, negligence of routine 
safety inspection (1) and risky driving behaviors (3) are driven by a lack of safety 
awareness and knowledge (2), which is driven by a lack of safety education and 
safety knowledge popularization (14) and inadequate laws and regulations (15). 
As described above, in developing countries such as China, bus drivers are usually 
middle-age persons who mostly are not very well educated. In addition, owing 
to economic situations, only a few training programs on bus safety are provided 
by operator companies and society. In addition, specific laws and regulations 
are lacking, as little attention is paid to bus fires. This could possibly be because 
cases of arson have become frequent only recently; previously, bus fires were 
mainly caused by self-ignition with only a few casualties. In summary, drivers, 
particularly those who are not very well educated, lack safety knowledge and 
safety awareness, which is the direct reason for drivers neglecting routine safety 
inspection and engaging in risky driving.
• In summary, we can determine the delivery mechanism of the influence of risk 
factors: depth factors influence driver-related factors, then are passed on to 
passenger-related factors, and finally to the outcome, bus fires. Vehicle-related 
factors and other environment factors are independent factors and are not 
influenced by depth factors.
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Summary and Conclusions
This study identified and prioritized 17 critical risk factors associated with bus fires using 
previous accident records and the Delphi approach. These risk factors involve subjective 
assessment, so they are difficult to model. Hence, it was necessary to identify the 
dominant risk factors by studying their influence-dependence. ISM was used as a tool 
for preparing the hierarchical structure of these risk factors.
Based on the results of ISM analysis, findings and recommendations include the 
following:
• Inadequate laws and regulations is one of the most important risk factors 
associated with bus fires, and establishing appropriate laws and regulations 
would be advantageous for enhancing bus fire safety. Specific measures 
include the following: 1) The government should undertake efforts to establish 
specialized laws related to bus fires. Taking other risk factors into consideration, 
laws should be established to punish arsonists and delinquent drivers, trace 
accountability to bus operator companies, and penalize passengers who do not 
prevent or report suspicious circumstances to drivers or who possess explosive 
goods or fire sources. 2) Bus administrative departments and operator companies 
should enact more stringent regulations based on laws and local conditions, 
and actions should be taken to ensure that the regulations are being effectively 
implemented. 
• Lack of safety education and safety knowledge popularization causes 
significant risk, and measures for addressing it include 1) the government 
investing in safety education, 2) social organizations and commonweal 
organizations conducting lectures and training for bus drivers and passengers, 
and 3) conducting proper fire drills.
• Drivers play an important role in bus fires because all driver-related elements 
fall into the relative low levels in the ISM. Measures that can be taken to 
counter driver-associated risk factors include the following: 1) Establish rules of 
pre-intervention in hiring bus drivers, aimed at selecting safer drivers who have 
less risky driving behaviors and who have a clearer understanding of bus safety. 
2) Increase driver pay and decrease work intensity. In China, hiring bus drivers 
have become increasingly difficult; few young people are willing to be bus drivers 
mainly because the salary is poor, resulting in an increase in the average age 
of drivers who are not very well educated. Moreover, drivers have more work 
stress, which can lead to more accidents. Therefore, economic factors may have 
favorable impact on bus fire safety. 3) Establish and improve training systems and 
ascertain scientific training and evaluation methods. In this way, regulations can 
be carried out effectively, and driving behaviors could improve. 
With regard to risk factors related to the vehicle (bus), some measures could be taken: 
1) Routine maintenance and daily checking should be conducted, and aging buses 
should be put out of service. 2) More human-friendly and safer designs should be 
employed, such as emergency buttons both inside and outside the bus for shutting 
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down all systems, a bus fire early warning system, an armored window glass bursting 
remote control system, an automatic alarm, a door opening and spraying device 
for a bus (Yu 2014), automatic fire suppression systems permanently installed in 
the engine compartments (Brandt and Modin et al. 2013), impulse fine dry powder 
fire extinguishing technology (Yang and M et al. 2006), highly-integrated data bus 
automatic fire extinguishing system (Frasure and Norris et al. 2013), and other new 
technologies and devices. 
The results of current research indicate that more studies should to be conducted 
to improve bus safety, and the following research directions are proposed: the 
development of 1) technology for pre-identifying dangerous passengers; 2) a simple 
security device for buses or stations; and 3) more effective fire recognition technology 
and extinguishing devices.
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